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Abstract: This paper tries to show that framing a propedeutics for a given 
discipline necessarily presupposes some so-called analytical movements with 
which the conceptual frame of the discipline could be related to itself, and to other 
disciplines as well. The situation is the same with communication studies, where, 
as this paper proposes, many of the so-called axioms of human communication 
should have been analyzed. After explicating the main types of analysis, the 
discussion tries to apply its analytical methods on Watzlawick’s first axiom of 
human communication, and tries to show, that the statement that ’one cannot not 
communicate’ is either false or meaningless. 
 





 Since the role which analysis plays in the formal and the so-called hard (or natural) sciences 
is unquestionable long before, it’s unsurprising that social sciences also developed their 
analytic methods in time. Maybe it’s not odd to say that the state of a given discipline could 
be estimated through its analytical methods, but, of course, it’s not obvious that an analytical 
method should be explicitly called analysis. The main concern of this paper is to estimate the 
possible role of analysis in communication inquiry which could be informative in connection 
with the state of the discipline. For this end this discussion starts with the analysis 
of ’analysis’ itself, then it tries to apply the various analytical forms to pure communication 
inquiry. Finally, as an object-lesson, the discussion ends with the analysis of the eminently 
antinomic but much popular statement that ’one cannot not communicate’.  
 
 Analyzing analysis 
 
 The English word ’analysis’ obviously derives from the Greek ἀνάλὔσις which first of all  
means loosing, releasing or dissolving (Liddel-Scott 1996), but also means problem solving.  
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                   In the logic, or more precisely, in the dialectics of Aristotle ἀνάλὔσις means the process of 
the reduction of the imperfect figures into the perfect one. So analysis originally means a 
problem solving method, where the problem could be physical (as in the case of releasing a 
knot) and intellectual (as in the case of clarifying an ambiguous situation) as well. The 
manifold interpretations of the verb ἀναλύω (which stands for the English ’to analyze’) 
strengthen the notion that analysis means, first of all, clarification, because  ἀναλύω means to 
unloose, to undo, to set free, to cancel faults, to release from a spell.  
 
 But the fact that analysis is clarification could be affirmed without reference to its etymology: 
suffice it to say that the methods that call themselves analysis do clarification. Of course this 
short paper could not present a historically coherent picture of the concept of analysis, but it 
could delineate the most characteristic types. Let us suppose, that the logical structure of 
‹Analysis› runs as follows. 
 
(1)  Analysis ‹analyseri...;‹analysandumi...;analysansi...›› 
 
 The formula (1) means that the process of analysis should be interpreted as ordering, which 
requires three necessary constituents. So analyses include the matching of (at least) one 
analysandum and (at least) one analysans by (at least) one analyser, where the analysandum 
is the target of the analysis (which has to be analysed); analysans is the product, and analyser 
is the agent of the analysis. In linguistic terms, analysis could be interpreted with thematic 
roles
i
 as follows. 
 
(2) The analyser analyses the analysandum for the analysans. 
 
(2a) λzλyλx {ANALYSE (x(y,z))} 
 
(2b) The analyserAg analyses the analysandumT for the analysansP. 
 
(2c) AGENT >dep TARGET >dep PRODUCT 
 
(2d) /Analyse/[V]λx λy λz λs [ANALYSE(s) & Agent (z,s) & Target (y,s) & Product (x,s)] 
 
 The formulas (2) – (2d) show that, logically, the analysans depends on the analysandum 
which depends on the analyser. Of course it could be assumed that in an „analysis” the 
analysandum depends on the analysans, but in this case the analysis should be accounted as 
fake, or the thematic roles should be inverted as in (3). 
 
(3)  (x)AG >dep (y)PRD >dep (z)TRG  (x)AG >dep (y)TRG >dep (z)PRD 
 
 The above mentioned consideration could be easily illustrated by a simple type of analysis, 
namely translation. Let’s suppose that an agent tries to translate the English verb ’to occur’ to 
German. Then the analysis would be translation, the analysandum would be the verb ’to 
occur’, and the analysans would be ’vorkommen’, and ’to occure’ should be 
precede ’vorkommen’. When an agent tries to find an adequate match for ’vorkommen’, 
then ’vorkommen’ will be the analysandum, and ’to occure’ will be the analysans. Of course, 
in the case of a simple translation, this kind of inversion could be easily perceived, but it 
should be kept in mind in the case of less common analyses too.  
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              But the indefinite constituents of the formula (1) show that (1) could be interpreted many 
ways depending on the indices of the arguments. It means that, for example, plural analysans 
with singular analysandum makes a different kind of analysis than  singular analysans with 
plural analysandum. Actually, every interpretation of (1) constitutes a type of it, so the 
following interpretations all have the logical structure of (1), but the same time they are quite 
unlike in practice.  
 
 On the types of analysis 
 
 The statement that definition could be interpreted as a kind of analysis maybe run against the 
philosophical tradition but it may be tenable upon further consideration. The logical structure 
of definition runs as follows. 
 
(4) Definition ‹definiatori...;‹definiendumi...;definiensi...›› 
 
 Of course a middle-sized library could have been crowded with books discoursing on the 
philosophical tradition of the single word definition; but there are at least two interpretations 
in connection with definitions that should be certainly mentioned here. The problem here is 
similar with the Kantian question regarding mathematical and philosophical definition (Kant 
1781). According to the first interpretation, definition should be considered as the 
determination of an intensional equality between expressions. In effect, here definition is 
fixation. For example, defining communication could be as follows. 
 
(4) Definition ‹definiatori...;‹communication;‹information processing.›› 
 
(4a) λzλyλx {DEFINE (x(y,z))} 
 
(4b) The definiatorAg define communicationT for information processingP. 
 
(4c) AGENT >dep TARGET >dep PRODUCT 
 
(4d) /Define/[V]λx λy λz λs [DEFINE(s) & Agent (z,s) & Target (y,s) & Product (x,s)] 
 
 The formulas under (4) show that here definition fixates the intensional equality of two 
expressions, namely ’communication’ and ’information processing’. But a definition of this 
kind could be prosperous only if both expressions are parts of the language, and at least one 
of them is well known or retraceable to some self-evident fact or entity. The most famous 
example of definition of this kind is the circumscribe of bachelor as wifeless man, and 
definitions of this kind are usually called as analytical. Of course there are many wifeless 
men that could never be considered as bachelors, while no bachelor could have wife that 
squarely shows that analytical definitions could constitute semantical implications instead of  
intensional equality.
ii
 Definitions of this kind could be easily found in the field of social 
sciences, and they could be called as methodological definitions.  
 
 But there are another sort of definitions that mostly take place in the field of formal sciences 
including mathematics and logics. Here definition means constituting, as in the case of (5). 
 
(5)  Definition ‹definiatori...;‹fractal;‹a set for which the Hausdorff Besicovitch dimension strictly 
exceeds the topological dimension››iii 
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(5a) λzλyλx {DEFINE (x(y,z))} 
 
(5b) The definiatorAg define fractalT for a set for which the Hausdorff Besicovitch dimension 
strictly exceeds the topological dimensionP. 
 
(5c) AGENT >dep TARGET >dep PRODUCT 
 
(5d) /Define/[V]λx λy λz λs [DEFINE(s) & Agent (z,s) & Target (y,s) & Product (x,s)] 
 
 It’s easy to see that in the case of (5) and related formulas (at least) the definiendum had been 
constituted by the definition. The ontological status of the constituted definiendum is an 
object of sustained controversy amongst philosophers and mathematicians, but the minimal 
notion that, at least conceptually, a new entity arises by the definition of this kind seems to be 
plausible as a general rule.  Definitions constituting new entities could be called real 
definitions.
iv
 The above mentioned considerations in connection with methodological and real 
definitions should be noted in the case of other analytical methods.  
 
 The next characteristic type of analytical methods is the so-called reductive analysis. An 
analysis should be called reductive when the analysandum could be eliminated from a 
description by the analysans. 
 
(6a)  Analysis ‹analyser‹descriptioni ‹…analysandum…››  
 
(6b)  Analysis ‹‹analyser‹ descriptionj‹...‹analysansi, analysansj…››  
 
 (6c)  analyser‹descriptioni ≡ descriptionj› 
 
(6d) λzλyλx {ANALYSE (x(y,z))} 
 
(6e) The reductive-analyserAg reductive-analyse communicationT for information processingP. 
 
(6f) AGENT >dep TARGET >dep PRODUCT 
 
(6g) /Reductive-analyse/[V]λx λy λz λs [REDUCTIVE-ANALYSE(s) & Agent (z,s) & Target 
(y,s) & Product (x,s)] 
 
 Two important feature of reductive analysis should be mentioned here. First, the real products 
of analyses of this kind are the descriptions from where the analysandum had been eliminated. 
A reductive analysis affirms that all meaningful descriptions with the analysed analysandum 
could be (or even must be) alternated by descriptions with the analysant. So a reductive 
analysis often presupposes that the analysans is somehow more elementary than the 
analysandum: the analysis-concepts of Carnap, Russell or the early Wittgenstein were 
certainly of this kind. For example, in the case of ’communication as information processing’ 
a reductive analysis could affirm that the complex expression ’information processing’ refers 
to more elementary entities (or: consists of more elementary concepts) than ’communication’, 
and, basically, all meaningful descriptions containing ’communication’ should be alternated 
with descriptions containing ’information processing’ instead of ’communication’. But the 
term ’elementary’ could be interpreted at least two ways. First, it could be interpreted 
vertically, which means that the analysandum supervenes on the analysant (as, with some  
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              simplification, organs could be considered as entities supervene on cells which supervene on 
atoms). Second, it could be interpreted horizontally, which means that analysandum is a 
complex of analysans (as a table is a complex of its legs and leaf). But in both cases reductive 
analysis affirms that the analysandum could be examinable in the terms of the analysans 
(which statement evokes hard controversies in connection with the limits and fields of many 
disciplines, for example in the case of the philosophy of mind).  
 
 Second, interpreting the symbol of identity (≡)v in the case of the formula (6c) raises many 
problems. It is obvious enough, that, in the case of reductive analysis, the analysans and the 
analysandum could not be merely synonyms, because the analytic level of the analysans must 
be more elementary than the analysandum’s. So, first of all, (6c) could be interpreted 
extensionally, which means that the reference of the analysandum and the reference of the 
analysans is one and the same (of course, this way of interpretations could lead to serious 
problems in mathematics and social sciences. Moreover, it’s very hard to imagine, that a 
reference of this kind could be find for ’communication’ and ’information processing’). An 
alternative interpretation could suggest that that formula (6c) should be interpreted 
intensionally, which means that the meaning of the analysandum and the meaning of the 
analysans is one and the same. Here reduction should show that the meaning of the 
analysandum could be derived from the meaning of the analysans, which means that the 
concept for the analysandum conceptually depends on the concept for the analysans (and, of 
course, this interpretation raises all the philosophical questions in connection with ’meaning’. 
For example, it’s hard to maintain the idea that the concept of ’communication’ depends 
(conceptually, logically or even epistemologically) on the concepts of ’information’ 
and ’processing’). And, finally, (6c) could be interpreted methodologically, which means that 
phenomena could be described as communication could be exhaustively described as 
information processing - on a more basical level. Methodological interpretations are very 
popular in social sciences, and, in connection with ’communication as information 
processing’, it does not raise any serious philosophical problem – because of the fact that it 
seems to be simply false.  
 
 But the earlier mentioned presupposition of most reductive analyses - that the analysans is 
somehow more elementary than the analysandum – is not necessarily prevails. Instead of 
being more elementary, analysans could be held as a problem-solving appliance. This 
conception presupposes that the analysandum and the analysans are being able to fill the 
same cognitive function, while the analysans eliminates some – usually scientific or 
philosophical – problem which holds with the use of the analysandum. A similar view had 
been held by Quine (1960) who though that a reductive analysis of this kind is, in fact, not an 
analysis but a construction, where the analyser generates constructions instead of 
decomposing complex formulas.  
 
 A third kind of reductive analysis, namely explication (Carnap 1967) could be formalized as 
follows. 
 
(7a)     Explication ‹explicator‹explicandumi, explicandumj ... explicandumn ›;‹explicans››  
 
(7b) λzλyλx {EXPLICATE (x(y,z))} 
 
(7c) The explicatorAg explicate (conversation and dance and...networking)T for communicationP. 
 
(7d) AGENT >dep TARGET >dep PRODUCT 
M. Demeter                                                                                                                               36 
                                                                                                                                                                                
KOME − An International Journal of Pure Communication Inquiry Volume 1 Issue 1  p. 31-45. 
 
 
(7e) /Explicate/[V]λx λy λz λs [EXPLICATE(s) & Agent (z,s) & Target (y,s) & Product (x,s)] 
 
 In the case of an explication, as it could be seen by the formalism, an explicator usually 
orders only one analysans for many analysandum. Because of the fact that the direction of an 
explication is seemingly just the opposite as the direction of analysis (in a narrow sense), 
which usually orders many analysans for an analysandum, a question may be raised whether 
explication is an instance of analysis or synthesis, but this question should not be answered 
here.  
 As opposed to reductive analyses, a logical analysis won’t drive the analysis to ’more basical 
levels’ but it tries to brighten the logical structure of the analysandum. In this case the 
analysans belong to a dictionary of a logical system L, as in the case of (8). 
 
(8a)  Logical analysis ‹analyser‹descriptioni ‹…analysandum…››  
 
(8b)  Logical analysis ‹‹analyser‹ descriptionj‹...‹analysansi, analysansj…› Li›  
 
(8c)  analyser‹descriptioni ≡ descriptionj› 
 
(8d) λzλyλx {ANALYSE (x(y,z))} 
 
(8e) The analyserAg logical-analyse (every communication is a kind of information processing)T 
for (x FxGx)P. 
 
(8f) AGENT >dep TARGET >dep PRODUCT 
 
(8g) /Logical-analyse/[V]λx λy λz λs [LOGICAL-ANALYSE(s) & Agent (z,s) & Target (y,s) & 
Product (x,s)] 
 
 Here logical analysis could show that, for example in the case of (6e), if something is 
affirmed as communication the same thing must be affirmed as information processing. Of 
course formulas with entailment could not be inverted, so a logical analysis of this kind could 
not be considered as a class of definition. So the logical description under (8e) would be false 
for communication in every case when something could be affirmed as communication but 
the same thing (or event, or action etc) could not be affirmed as information processing. In 
other cases the entailment will be true. But it’s easy to see that (8e) can not be true since there 
are many examples of communication that do not contain information processing at all (for 
example in the cases of „fatic” communication).  
 
 An additional kind of analysis is the conceptual analysis which is concerned with the N 
natural (or ordinary) language.  
 
(9a)  Conceptual analysis ‹analyser‹descriptioni ‹…analysandum…›››  
 
(9b)  Conceptual analysis ‹analyser‹ descriptionj ‹...‹analysansi, analysansj…› N››  
 
 (9c)  analyser‹descriptioni ≡ descriptionj› N 
 
(9d) λzλyλx {CONCEPTUAL ANALYSE (x(y,z))} 
 
(9e) The analyserAg conceptual-analyse communicationT for information processingP. 
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(9f) AGENT >dep TARGET >dep PRODUCT 
 
(9g) /Conceptual-analyse/[V]λx λy λz λs [CONCEPTUAL-ANALYSE(s) & Agent (z,s) & Target 
(y,s) & Product (x,s)] 
 
 A conceptual analysis usually investigates the logical structure of ordinary language and the 
so-called normal usage of a given expression which includes the investigation of the 
conditions by which an expression could or could not be applied for an entity. So a 
conceptual analysis could serve as a propedeutics for a given discipline but, because of its 
firm binding to the natural language, could not be an instrument for setting it up.  
 
 The last kind of analysis should be mentioned here is the so-called connective analysis 
(Strawson 1992) which tries to explain the analysandum and its relations with other concepts 
without substituting it, which means that in the case of a connective analysis the analysandum 
could be a part of the analysans.  
 
(10a)  Connective analysis ‹analyser‹descriptioni ‹…analysandum…›››  
 
(10b)  Connective analysis ‹analyser‹ descriptionj ‹...analysandum, analysansi, analysansj…››  
 
(10c)  analyser‹descriptioni ≡ descriptionj› 
 
(10d) λzλyλx {CONNECTIVE ANALYSE (x(y,z))} 
 
(10e) The analyserAg connective-analyse communicationT for (communication in relation with 
information processing)P. 
 
(10f) AGENT >dep TARGET >dep PRODUCT 
 
(10g) /Connective-analyse/[V]λx λy λz λs [CONNECTIVE-ANALYSE(s) & Agent (z,s) & Target 
(y,s) & Product (x,s)] 
 
 In short, connective analysis could be considered as a minimum concept of analysis, as 
Strawson writes: „Let us abandon the notion of perfect simplicity in concepts; let us abandon 
even the notion that analysis must always be in the direction of greater simplicity. Let us 
imagine, instead, the model of an elaborate network, a system, of connected items, concepts, 
such that the function of each item, each concept, could, from the philosophical point of view, 
be properly understood only by grasping its connections with the others, its place in the 
system – perhaps better still, the picture of a set of interlocking systems of such a kind” 
(STRAWSON 1992;19) 
 
 If conceptual analysis should be considered as a tool for  constructing a propedeutics for a 
given discipline, then connective analysis should be considered as a tool for searching the 
position of it in connection with other disciplines. So it could be said without 
oversimplification that conceptual analyses should proceed, and connective analyses should 
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 An analysis of the so-called first axiom of human communication 
 
 The second part of this discussion would try to apply the method of analysis to a 
platitudinous statement in connection with communication, namely, that ’one cannot not 
communicate’.  
 
(11)  One cannot not communicate. 
 
 The idea expressed by this statement has been the subject matter of much discussion in recent 
time, and most communication theorists seem to accept it. The idea is referable with the so-
called Palo-Alto school, and, more precisely, with Paul Watzlawick (1967). The question 
may be raised what Watzlawick meant by it, and it should also be ask what different things 
could be meant by it. This paper shall not discuss these questions at all, but investigates 
whether the idea, when understand in a certain way, could be true or not.
vi
 
 It’s obvious at first sight that in the statement (11) the expression ’communicating’ falls 
under an act-category, but it’s far more obscure what the reference of ’one’ could be. 
Anyway, the logical structure of (11) could be formalized as follows: 
 
(11a)  ‹x› ‹Fx›  
 
 which means that it’s not possible for an x that x is not F, and it could be transformed as 
(11b) shows; 
 
(11b)  ‹x› ‹Fx› 
 
 which means that it’s necessary for an x that x is F. So the most broad interpretation of (11) 
says that everything must communicate, which could be narrowed by the famous Quineian 
approach as every being must communicate.
vii
 As it will be seen, this narrower interpretation 
still suffers from philosophical problems but, at least, liberates non-existent entities from the 
compulsion of communication. Since in logic the substantive verb ’to be’ could not be 
handled as a predicate, but as a quantifier, the undermentioned interpretations both have the 
logical form of (11b). 
 
(11ba)  If x exists, than x must communicate. 
 
(11bb)  If x communicates, than x must exist. 
 
 (11ba) says that communication includes
viii
 existence, because from (11ba) it follows by 
modus tollens that if x does not communicate it could not exist and by modus ponens it is 
impossible for x that it exists and do not communicate; but when x is non-existent than x is 
free to communicate or not.
ix
 (11bb) rather says that existence includes communication, 
because from (11bb) it follows by modus tollens that if x do not exist it could not 
communicate and by modus ponens it is impossible for x that it exists and do not 
communicate; but when x does not communicate it is free to be or not to be. It could be seen 
that (11ba) and (11bb) contradict each other because (11bb) allows x to be and not to 
communicate which is impossible by (11ba). And, because of it, (11bb) contradicts to the 
statement that one cannot not communicate. But with a Quineian paraphrase (11b) could be 
interpreted in a third way as follows. 
 
(11bc)  To be is to communicate. 
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 Consider that (11bc) expresses and identity statement
x; then it seems that the meaning of ’to 
be’ is the same as the meaning of ’to communicate’.xi Consider again that (11bc) could be               
regarded as any kind of analysis from definition to reductive analysis etc. Then the question 
may be raised: which component of (11bc)  is the analysandum, and which one is the 
analysans? (11bca) and (11bcb) show the difference. 
 
(11bca)  Analysis ‹analyseri...;‹to be...;to communicate.›› 
 
(11bcb)  Analysis ‹analyserj...;‹to communicate...;to be.›› 
 
 In the case of the former, the analyser tries to explicate the meaning of existence, while he 
takes the meaning of communication for granted. In the case of the latter, the analyser tries to 
explicate the meaning of communication, while he takes the meaning of existence for granted. 
But in both cases, ’to communicate’ entails ’to be’ and ’to be’ entails ’to communicate’, so 
the logical connective between the concept of communication and the concept of existence is 
biconditional (iff). It means that, literally, everything that communicates exists, and 
everything that exist communicates. However, this biconditional evokes many problems in 
both directions that could not be discussed here in details, but two considerations should be 
proposed. First, the statement that which communicates exist seems intuitively true but trivial 
since it’s hard to imagine anything which communicates in spite of the fact that it do not exist 
or, at least, it must had been existed. But the same could be predicated on almost every verb 
say ’to sit’ or ’to see’ etc, so this statement is not too informative. Second, the statement that 
which exists communicates seems intuitively problematic since there are entities that not 
communicates in the strict sense of the word ’to communicate’, for example, it’s hard to say 
that an armchair or the Milky Way communicates. But this second statement is obviously far 
more interesting than the first one, since the theological interpretation of communication 
could corroborate the conception that which exists communicates.
xii
 Of course an analysis of 
this interpretation could not be performed here.  
 Naturally, the idea behind the statement (11) surely narrows the scope of predication to 
human agents, which is revealable from the original text of Watzlawick’s. Though (11) is the 
most quoted form of the original idea – which leads, as it was discussed above, to 
indefensible or, at least, problematic consequences – a refined interpretation of the idea may 
be proved tenable. Consider the statement expressed by (12). 
 
(12)  A human agent cannot not communicate.  
 
 The logical form of (12) is: 
 
(12a)  ‹x› Fx  G‹x›xiii 
 
 where F signifies the property of being a human agent, and G signifies the property of being 
in communication. Then (12a) is the logical expression of the proposition that it is impossible 
for an entity to be a human agent and not to be in communication. This statement is 
equivalent with (12b) 
 
(12b)  Fx  G‹x›xiv 
 
 which expresses the proposition that is necessary for an entity that if it is a human agent than 
it communicates. Both formulas allow not-human-agents to communicate (or not). Since the  
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              The argumentation, which concludes to the statement that one cannot not communicate could 




(12ca)  A human agent cannot not behave. 
 








 Now consider the logical structure of the argumentation. 
 
(12da)  ‹x› Fx  G‹x› 
 
(12db)  ‹x› Gx  H‹x› 
 
(12dc)  ‹‹x› Fx  G‹x››  ‹‹x› Gx  H‹x››  ‹‹x› Fx  H‹x›› 
 
 which is equivalent with (12ea)-(12ec) 
 
(12ea)  ‹x› Fx  G‹x› 
 
(12eb)  ‹x› Gx  H‹x› 
 
(12ec)  ‹‹x› Fx  G‹x››  ‹‹x› Gx  H‹x››  ‹‹x› Fx  H‹x›› 
 
 which means that if ’to behave’ includes ’to be a human agent’ and ’to communicate’ 
includes ’to behave’ than ’to communicate’ includes ’to be a human agent’.xix In any way 
soever, this deduction seems correct, but only if its premisses are acceptable. However, this 
discussion tries to show that they are deeply problematical. 
 
 The first premiss says that a human agent cannot not behave. This statement lies on the 
presupposition that there is no anti-behavior, or, in other words, behavior has no opposite. 
But this is nonsense, and argumentation must not have a counter-example to show its 
absurdity.
xx
 Consider first, that the application of any expression presupposes a rule by which 
it is decidable whether it could or could not be predicated for an entity.
xxi
 If anything an agent 
does is behaviour, then ’to do’ entails ’to behave’; if an agent must (in every occasion) do 
something, then ’to do’ includes ’to be’. But this is not suitable for the normal use of the 
terms ’to do’, ’to behave’ and ’to be’, nor does it have any reasonably plus for a scientific 
language. Second, if a predicate or property must be stated for every argument in its 
extension then the application of that predicate or property is apodictical, in other words, 
analytical. It means that the meaning of the predicate is part of the meaning of the argument. 
So, if human agents must behave (in every occasion) then the meaning of ’to behave’ is part 
of the meaning of ’to be a human agent’, which seems to be absurd. And, finally, the reason 
of using a descriptive expression is that it could be true or false. When, in an observable 
situation, any state or action should be described as behaviour in any case, then the 
hypothesis that a human agent cannot not behave could not be falsified. But there is massive  
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 tradition behind the rule that refutability is one of the key requirements for any scientific 
hypothesis.  
 
The situation is the very same with (12cb) which states that all behaviour in an interactional 
situation is communication. When it cannot be decided whether a behaviour is 
communication or not, then either there is no adequate rule for the application of both 
expressions, namely, ’communication’ and ’behaviour’ or they are synonyms, which is 
absurd. Furthermore, the complex expression ’behaviour in an interactional situation’ uses an 
expression, namely interaction, which is often used as a synonym for communication in 
ordinary language.  In this latter case (12cb) would not be absurd but trivial.
xxii
 And once 
again, if the question whether a behaviour in an interactional situation is communication or 
not could not be raised, than using both expressions has no scientific values in the world.
xxiii
  
 After all, this paper proposes that the incapabilities derive from accepting the analyzed 
statement are based on a more fundamental misconception which should be explicated. This 
misconception derives from confusing communication with the fact, that every act and state 
could be considered as communication. This consideration, however, could be either true or 
false.
xxiv
 Let us consider a situation which is similar to an example of Watzlawick. An agent 
A is sitting on a pew with closed eyes, while an agent B tries to setting up hypotheses about 
A. Here the multifariousness of the hypotheses is the most conspicuous thing, since B could 
think that, for example: 
 
(13a)  A does not want to communicate with B. 
 
(13b)  A likes to be shown mysterious, and he wants to be addressed by B. 
 
(13c)  A is sleeping. 
 
(13d)  A is dead. 
 
(13e)  A is in prayer. 
 
 And so on.  The question could be raised: in which cases could anybody say that A 
communicates with B? In ordinary language the answer is easy, since only the cases (12a) 
and (12b) could be considered as communication between A and B, while (13c) and (13d) are 
not communications at all, and (13e) should be considered as a communication between A 
and C, namely God. Moreover, the propositions expressed by (13a) and (13b) contradict each 
other, so (at least) one of them should be false.   
 
 Of course objections could be made against this argumentation: one can say (with 
Watzlawick) that in the case of (13a) A communicates, that he don’t want to communicate 
with B; in the case of (13b) A communicates, that he wants to communicate with B; in the 
case of (13c) A (or, at least, his body) communicates, that he is sleeping; in the case of (13d) 
the body of A communicates, that A is dead and in the case of (13e) A communicates with 
God and in addition, communicates to B that he communicates with God. But these 
objections confuse the mental state of B with the communication between A and B by all 
odds. This is only the mental capacities of an agent which enables him considering practically 
anything as communication. What is more, a human agent could consider not just other 
agent’s actions and states as communications, but his own mental states as well.xxv And the 
situation is the same with any physical, mental, social or ideal object in the past, in the 
present and in the future, with actual and with possible, or even impossible ones.
xxvi
 Still,  
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 there is an exceptionally odd shade in the statement that A thinks that a round square 
communicates with him.  
  
              So there is a capital difference between the following cases: 
 
(14a)  B communicates with A. 
 
(14b)  A thinks, that B communicates with A. 
 If there were no difference between the situations expressed by (14a) and (14b) then there are 
no rules by which the term ’to communicate’ can be correctly applied. Where the possibility 




 This discussion tried to show that analysis should play an operative role in consolidating a 
discipline. But analyses could not be achieved in a conceptual vacuum: they always 
presuppose a method and some basical concepts that serve as analysans. Moreover, there are 
many kinds of analyses that have the same logical structure but different presuppositions. 
This paper tried to explicate some of them. After ascertaining the necessity of analysis, the 
discussion applied its analytical methods on a so-called axiom of human communication, 
namely on the one which states that one cannot not communicate. If only an analysis of this 
kind would had been attempted earlier, then the axiom in question would not be so evident 
nowadays, because the analysis presented in this paper shows that the axiom is either false or 
meaningless. But it’s evident, that in the process of consolidating a discipline, an imperious 
misconception could be as beneficial as an appropriate design at times. 
  
 
             NOTES 
 
i
 For the formalism of thematic roles see, for example,  Bornkessel 2006. 
ii
 There are many objections against intensional equality in connection with definitions, see Kripke for a 
classical framing.  
iii
 This is Mandelbrot’s definition of fractals, see Mandelbrot 1983,15. 
iv
 Mathematics is overrun with definitions of this kind, consider for example the definitions of entities like 
’number’, ’set’, or complex ones like ’Triadic Cantor Dust’ (See, for example Edgar 2008). The so-called 
intensional problems with definitions could be illustrated by a seemingly simple example. Consider a definition 
of ’2’ as (i). 
 
(i) Definition ‹definiatori...;‹2;‹1+1›› 
 
Of course here ’definition’ means the fixation of an equality, but this equality surely cannot be intensional: no  
body thinks normally that ’2’ means ’1+1’, and it’s easy to see that the number of equality-definitions for ’2’ is 
potentially infinite. But the notion that ’2’ and ’1+1’ refers to the same object, as in the case of extensional 
equality, seems to be problematic (at least for nominalists). This example represents the main problem with 
methodological definitions, and arguing for ‹communication;‹information processing›› is none the worse hard 
that arguing for ‹2;‹1+1››. 
v
 In most cases ’identity’ signifies identification, which causes serious epistemological problems.  
vi
 This method goes back to von Wright’s procedure in connection with the Kantian idea of ’Ought entails Can’ 
(WRIGHT 1963). 
vii
 Quine’s slogan is ’to be is to be the value of a variable’, which could narrow the scope of x in the case of (11), 
see Quine 1953. 
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 Here ’to include’ should be considered as a set-theoretical relation, where the included set is closer than the 
includer.  
ix
 Among others, absurdities of this kind could have been led logicians to forbid using the substantive verb as 
predicate. 
x
 Of course, as it was already mentioned, in logic ’to be’ and ’exist’ could not be used as a predicate, but in 
ordinary language substantive verbs are often functioning as predicates. This paper should not discuss on the 
topic of the so-called logical disfunctions of ordinary languages.  
xi
 So identity here should be considered intensionally, because the extensional interpretation of the same 
statement evokes serious philosophical problems that could not be discussed here.  
xii
 See for example Psalm 19:  „The heavens declare the glory of God; the skies proclaim the work of his hands.  
Day after day they pour forth speech; night after night they reveal knowledge. They have no speech, they use 




goes out into all the earth, their words to the ends of 
the world.” 
xiii
 Or ‹x› ‹Fx   Gx› 
xiv
 Or ‹x› ‹Fx   Gx› 
xv
 This, naturally, does not mean that (12) could not be criticized per se, but in this form the statement seems 
more contentless than problematic.   
xvi
 The basis of this interpretation is the original text of Watzlawick et al (1967), Ch 2, pp 48-51.   
xvii
 According to Watzlawick, communication should be conceived as message-units, so communications are the 
elements of interactions that consist of a finite number of communications (messages).  
xviii
 The Wikipedia entry on Watzlawick suggests a more elementary interpretation: „Every behavior is a kind of 
communication. Because behavior does not have a counterpart (there is no anti-behavior), it is not possible not 
to communicate.” The entry refers to Bateson (1972) in connection with this interpretation.  
xix
 This is to say that if to be a human agent entails to behave and to behave entails to communicate than to be 
a human agent entails to communicate.  
xx
 It does not mean that counter-examples could not be easily found. For example no one could reasonably 
state that a sleeping agent behaves. Watzlawick of course states that a behaviour need not be conscious. Then 
any observable state of an agent could be conceived as behaviour, which is absurd, because, for example, then 
a dead agent’s observable states should be comprehended as behaviour.  Of course in ordinary , and 
sometimes in scientific languages any corporeal action is called behaviour, for example, the behaviour of 
subatomic particles in a Wilson-chamber. But then any change could be described as behaviour, which means 
that the meaning of change and the meaning of behaviour is one and the same, and, according to Occam’s 
razor, a scientific language does not need more expressions than it is necessary.  
xxi
 One of the most articulate framing of this logical assumption is from Spencer Brown’s Laws of Form:  
„Distinction is perfect continence. That is to say, a distinction is drawn by arranging a boundary with separate 
sides so that a point on one side cannot reach the other side without crossing the boundary. (...). Once a 
distinction is drawn, the spaces, states, or contents on each side of the boundary, being distinct, can be 
indicated. There can be no distinction without motive, and there can be no motive unless contents are seen to 
differ in value. Thus the calling of the name can be identified with the value of the content.” (SPENCER-BROWN 
1972, p1). 
xxii
 Just like the statement that ’Every basilica in Europe is a cathedral’.  
xxiii
 Interestingly enough that a German website dedicated to Watzlawick delineates a logically different version 
of the axiom, which runs as follows: "Man kann nicht nicht kommunizieren, denn jede Kommunikation (nicht 
nur mit Worten) ist Verhalten und genauso wie man sich nicht nicht verhalten kann, kann man nicht nicht 
kommunizieren." (Paul Watzlawick Website http://www.paulwatzlawick.de/axiome.html). This (unauthentic) 
interpretation states that all communication is behaviour (instead of the original which states that all 
behaviour is communication). However, this argumentation is inconclusive because it allows behaviours that is 
not communications:   
 
(i)  ‹x› Fx  G‹x› 
(ii)  ‹x› Hx  G‹x› 
(iii)  ‹‹x› ‹Gx  Fx› 
 
xxiv
 In many-valued logics there are more than 2 values (true and false), and, for example, in a calculus of 
Lukasiewicz the number of truth-values could be potentially infinite.  
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 There are theories that postulate so-called inner communications, but the question may be raised whether 
they are communications or not. The author of this paper thinks that inner communications could not be 
conceived with the concepts of self-reference, because communication could not be reflexive, since the verb 
’to communicate’ ordinary needs at least two arguments. For example, Steve could not communicate with 
himself, but his father-role could communicate with his child-role, or his brain could communicate with his 
retina, and so on. Of course, the analytical level of a person should not be confused with the analytical level of 
his (psychological or sociological) roles or with the analytical level of his organs etc. The consideration that 
communications could be described in more than one analytical level is very important here, and the system-
theory could be helpful in explicating these questions, see, for example Luhmann 1984.  
xxvi
 There are possible world semantics for fictional and impossible worlds as well, see, for example,  Dolezel 
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